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RATIONAL AND EXTRA-RATIONAL MOTIVATIONS FOR
CORPORATE GIVING: COMPLEMENTING ECONOMIC THEORY
WITH ORGANIZATION SCIENCE
RIKKI ABZUG* & NATALIE J. WEBB**
I. INTRODUCTION

Economist Milton Friedman has forcefully argued that the corporate
social responsibility of business is to increase profits.' From this
neoclassical economic perspective, spending money on corporate giving is
wrong because it represents a waste of corporate assets. Furthermore,
management that engages in such giving shirks its fiduciary responsibility
to its principals-the firm's stockholders. If such rational economic theory
tells a manager not to engage in this type of activity, how can we explain
why this activity persists or grows? More pointedly, once we establish
economic rationales for giving, how might we explain variability of giving
behaviors across firms? We draw on theories from both economics and
management science to explain how giving activity, itself, may also be a
rational, or extra-rational, reaction to firm and environment conditions.
First we draw on four economic theories to understand the
(extra)rationality behind corporate giving: profit maximization, altruism,
social responsibility, and managerial utility. We explore the conditions
under which these economic theories affect firms differentially. Next, we
explore four organizational theories-agency theory, institutional theory,
stakeholder theory, and resource dependence theory-that complement the
economic theories. We again discuss the conditions under which these
theories help us explain the (extra)rational behavior of some firms'
management. Finally, we assert that while some neoclassical economists
may view corporate giving as irrational, other economists and
organizational scientists have used organizational contexts to understand
the (extra)rationality of firm managers' and owners' motivations to give.
If the social responsibility of business is to increase profits,2 why
would we have any corporate behavior that deviated from this goal?
Neoclassical economics is very effective at prescribing what should happen
for the sake of efficiency and profit, but not nearly as convincing when
explaining differential adoption of such formulae.
Where traditional
economics is silent, we must look to other theories and other literatures to
*
**

Professor, New York University, Stem School of Business.
Professor, Naval Postgraduate School.

1. See MILTON FRIEDMAN,
2. See id.
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explain widely observed behavioral phenomenon. In that spirit, this paper
visits two different, but, as we will argue, complementary literatures.
The first section of the paper uses neoclassical concepts to forge an
economic rationale for corporate giving behavior. We first establish an
economic argument for corporate giving that is consistent with goals of
profit maximization. Our next, and more difficult task is to question the
variability in likelihood of giving among firms. If giving is economically
rational, why don't all firms do so to the same extent? To begin to
fashion an answer to this question we summarize the major theoretical
perspectives developed by economists, and then we review extant empirical
studies. To get us closer to answering our between-firm variability
question, hypotheses are derived to explore when and where these
corporate giving motivations become salient.
The second section of the paper opens the black box, that is the firm,
and problematizes the idea of unitary action coming from that entity. The
second section of the paper introduces four theories from managerial
science and organizational sociology that may be used as lenses from
which to view and evaluate variations in corporate giving behavior by
individuals within organizational contexts. We pay particular attention to
those theories, garnered from managerial science, that have complements
in the economic literature.' Again, hypotheses are introduced that delimit
the relevant ranges of such theories. To supplement the economic
hypotheses, we also explore, from the management perspective, factors
that help determine which firms make the (extra)rational choice to engage
in corporate giving.

3. See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1982) (1933). See also
Evelyn Brody, Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit
and For-ProfitOrganizationalForms, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 457, 471 (1996); Eugene
F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON.
301 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976).
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II. ECONOMIC THEORIES
Business donated $7.4 billion to charity in 1995, 4 a 7.5% increase
over 1994 giving. 5 Company profits rose 11.9% last year, which appears
to be the fuel for increased giving.6 The Chronicle of Philanthropy
indicated that top companies planned increases in charitable donations in
1996, while, at the same time, corporate-giving staffs and other
expenses
7
associated with charitable giving programs were being cut.
Milton Friedman, and others, argue that corporate giving is not the
responsibility of business. 8 One point of controversy is that corporate
giving effectively subsidizes corporate after-tax income, because current
tax policies allow deductions for these gifts. 9 In fact, if one assumes a
corporate average tax rate of over 35% and marginal rates for large
corporations of 34-38%, gift deductions may represent as much as $2.5
billion in lost tax revenue (34% of the $7.4 billion in profits donated,
thereby avoiding taxation).'0 Economists and others may question whether
corporations can better support activities that would traditionally be
supported through direct expenditures by government or through
government support of nonprofit organizations. Although economists,
corporate executives, and nonprofit leaders have discussed the growth and
propriety of, as well as the reasons for, corporate giving for over fifty
years, many questions remain unanswered.
The reasons motivating corporate executives and stockholders to give
to charity are not clear. Corporate executives often attribute their gifts to
social responsibility, altruism, or "enlightened self-interest."
Other
4. See AM.

1996:

ASSOC. OF FUND RAISING COUNSEL ANNUAL SURVEY, GIVING U.S.A.
THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 1995 88 (1996)

[hereinafter GIVING 1996]. For this article "charity" is used in the broadest sense. It
includes all of the activities carried on by organizations in the nonprofit sector covered
in § 170(c) and all organizations covered in § 501(c)3 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986. These organizations are all entities that are exempt from federal income tax under
the principal exemption statute, § 501 of the Internal Revenue Code.

5. See id. at 89.
6. See id. at 90.
7. See Susan Gray & Jennifer Moore, Big Gifts from Big Business, CHRON. OF
PHILANTHROPY, July 11, 1996, at 7.
8. See FRIEDMAN, supranote 1, at 133-36 (arguing that the social responsibility of
business is to increase profits for shareholders).

9. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARITABLE GIVING
184 (1985); see also Natalie J. Webb, Corporate Profits and Social Responsibility:
'Subsidization' of CorporateIncome Under CharitableGiving Tax Laws, 48 J. ECON. &
Bus. 401, 402 (1996) [hereinafter Webb, Subsidization].
10. See Webb, Subsidization, supra note 9, at 402.
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observers may consider gifts to be only in the interest of the firm, or in
the interest of firm management or owners." Rarely are corporate gifts
seen to be completely altruistic or completely in the interest of society;
rather, they are often thought to be beneficial to others, but still in the
"interest" of the corporation.
The economics literature on corporate giving offers four possible
motivations: altruism, corporate social responsibility or duty, managerial
utility, and profit maximization. Each of these motivations is discussed in
a section below, followed by a section which ties the motives together. In
this section, "enlightened self-interest" is considered through the intangible
asset of corporate "goodwill" gained from making gifts to charitable
causes.
Incorporating goodwill into an economic model of profit
maximization allows us to include several motivations for giving in one
theoretical context.
A. Altruism
A simplistic explanation for corporate giving is that corporate owners
care not only about how the corporation benefits them financially, but also
about how actions of the corporation affect others. Altruism, an
"unselfish concern for or devotion to the welfare of others,"" likely
describes the actions of very few corporate owners or managers.
Corporate owners who may be thought of as altruistic have three good
reasons to contribute through the firm. First, a corporation-as opposed
to an individual-may be able to make larger gifts to a single organization.
These gifts may be more effective and may better serve the purposes of
both nonprofits and firm owners. In this case, however, individuals no
longer maintain control over allocation of the resources. Second, a
corporate "altruist" may avoid the problem of free-riding. When the
corporation decides to make a donation, all shareholders donate corporate
profits in proportion to shares held. Finally, because corporate dividends
are subject to double taxation-one round on corporate income and the
other on individual income earned in dividends-it is cost-effective for the
firm to make contributions. The firm avoids taxes on profits donated,
making the value of the contributions larger.
Although possible, it is unlikely that corporate executives are
completely altruistic. In addition to the benefit that society receives from
a donation, the corporation nearly always benefits from the added goodwill
11. See W.J. Baumol, Enlightened Self-Interest and Corporate Philanthropy, in
FOUNDATIONS, PRIvATE GIVING, AND PUBLIC POLICY 262 (1970).

12. Random House Dictionary of the English Language 62 (2d ed. 1987).

13. See Louis W. Fry et al., CorporateContributions: Altruistic or For-Profit?, 25
ACAD. MGMT. J. 94, 99 (1982).
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it creates, even if the donation is not highly publicized. 4 The recipient of
the grant nearly always knows the source of the gift, and, inevitably, some
employees, as well as others outside the firm, must know about the gift.
Corporate contributions, even if partially motivated by altruism, may also
serve the firm's "enlightened self-interest."' s
B. CorporateSocial Responsibility
Corporate social responsibility ("CSR") is often cited by corporate
executives as their motive for making donations. 16 Archie Carroll defines
corporate social responsibility as companies' economic, legal, ethical, and
philanthropic responses to the community's expectation that corporations
are good citizens. 17 Corporate executives say that supporting philanthropic
agencies is a way for the corporation to distribute some of the
corporation's gains, or to "give something back" to the community. They
may also include comments about conducting business in a socially
acceptable way, for example, caring about the health, safety, education,
development, and quality of life of not only employees and their families,
but their neighbors and local institutions.
Although researchers in economics, sociology, and other fields suggest
that social responsibility or duty motivates corporate executives to donate,
economists tend to believe that nearly all donations benefit the corporation
in some way. 8 Burlingame suggests three benefits accruing to companies
who practice CSR: public relations, financial performance, and employee
issues.19
Increased positive relations with the public come about in many ways.
Cause-related marketing and other promotional appeals have become a
standard way for corporations to link marketing with giving. Research has
shown that use of coupons, or other schemes, may be beneficial to both
corporations and charities because some consumers are motivated by
altruism and financial incentives. The benefit to the firm is increased sales
14. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 172.
15. See Edward J. Stendardi, Jr., Corporate Philanthropy: The Redefinition of
Enlightened Self-Interest, 29 Soc. ScI. J. 21, 22 (1992).
16. See generally Dwight F. Burlingame, Empirical Research on Corporate Social
Responsibility: What Does It Tell Us?, 4 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 473, 473-80
(1994) (describing motivations of corporate executives in philanthropic decision-making).
17. See Archie B. Carroll, The Pyramidof CorporateSocial Responsibility: Toward
the Moral Managementof OrganizationalStakeholders, 34 Bus. HORIZONS 39, 40 (1991).
18. See Katherine E. Maddox & John J. Siegfried, The Effect of Economic Structure
on CorporatePhilanthropy,in THE ECONOMICS OF FIRM SIZE, MARKET STRUCTURE, AND

SOCIAL PERFORMANCE 202, 203-05 (John J. Siegfried ed., 1980).
19. See Burlingame, supra note 16, at 474.
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or other benefits accruing because the corporation appears to be "socially
minded." In addition, Galaskiewicz and Atkinson suggest that corporate
CEOs use company donations to build public relations by earning respect
and approval in a community. 2'
Some evidence suggests that firms with higher levels of social
responsibility experience higher rates of return on assets and stock-market
returns, while other evidence suggests no correlation between giving and
corporate financial performance.
Shareholders may be interested in
holding stock in corporations that exhibit social responsibility.22
Generally, levels of corporate giving and firm financial performance are
correlated. What is not clear is whether higher profits allow larger gifts,
or larger gifts lead to higher profits. No studies conclusively prove
causation between higher levels of giving and better financial performance.
Finally, practicing CSR may result in greater employee respect. When
employers provide matching, gifts and support to local organizations,
employees may react by showing a greater degree of pride in their work,
or higher morale. The benefit to the corporation may be increased public
relations, increased productivity, or both. CSR may provide direct
benefits to company production or sales, or may reduce the costs of hiring,
training, and keeping employees.
Although CSR represents firms' responses to the call to be good
citizens, it may be the case that corporate executives are not motivated by
social responsibility. They may, in fact, feel pressure to support charitable
causes. In some areas, corporations are part of a community where giving
clubs or other groups "dictate" a socially acceptable amount to be donated.
If firms must contribute in order to be viewed as socially acceptable, then
corporate contributions are a necessary business expense, and donating
may be a profit-maximizing activity. Contributions made in this sort of
business environment are a necessary part of promoting the firm's image.
Although executives may claim CSR as motive for giving, they likely
keep in mind that most gifts provide benefits-albeit intangible in many
cases-to the firm. Galaskiewicz and Rauschenbach note that reciprocity,
when applied to nonprofits, may account for the range of philanthropic
20. See Allison Zippay, CorporateFunding of Human Services Agencies, 37 Soc.
WORK 210, 212 (1992); Maddox & Siegfried, supranote 18, at 202.
21. See Charles Peter Corcoran, Corporate Philanthropy: Attitudes of Institutional

Shareholders, Individual Shareholders, and Corporate Philanthropy Executives (1987)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file with author).

22. See Maddox & Siegfried, supranote 18, at 204-05.
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motives attributed to corporate giving. 23 Zippay notes that nonprofits
receive donations or in-kind goods from firms, and in exchange the firms
receive "increased sales, heightened prestige, a healthier business climate,
and social approval."24
C. Managerial Utility
In many large corporations, defining and monitoring the roles of
managers and owners is quite difficult. Williamson asserts that since
managers cannot separate their individual interests from occupational
decision-making, it cannot be assumed that firms are being operated to
maximize profits.'
Where managers behave as agents, they may
26
maximize their own utility, which is a function of their personal goals.
Managers may give because they are altruistic or because they enjoy
the prestige associated with being a big giver. Alchian and Kessel state
that "business contributions ... are attempts to acquire status, prestige,
and goodwill for management and the firm." 27 As noted above, managers
may want to participate in local civic and social organizations. To be able
to participate, and to be seen as good citizens, it may be the case that
corporate management executives feel pressure to support charitable
causes.
One aspect of the agency problem is how to view the
contributions: should they be viewed as altruism or CSR, or should they
be strictly categorized as a "perk" or part of the compensation package for
upper management?28
Clotfelter posited a model of managerial utility where management
sacrifices" profits in order to make contributions.
In his model
management values two "goods": after-tax profits and corporate
contributions.3" If managers are more productive because of their higher
23. See Joseph Galaskiewicz & Barbara Rauschenbach, The Corporation-Culture

Connection: A Test of InterorganizationalTheories, in COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS:
STUDIES IN RESOURCE MOBILIZATION AND EXCHANGE 119, 120-21 (Carl Milofsky ed.,

1988) (describing the motivations behind the "Exchange Theory").
24. Zippay, supra note 20, at 210.
25. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, ECONOMICS OF DISCRETIONARY
BEHAVIOR: MANAGERIAL OBJECTIVES IN A THEORY OF THE FIRM (1964) (identifying the

division between ownership and management, and the differing goals of each).
26. See id.
27. Armen A. Alchian & Reuben A. Kessel, Competition, Monopoly, and the
Pursuitof Pecuniay Gain, in ASPECTS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 156 (1962).
28. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3, at 308-10.

29. See

CLOTFELTER,

30. See id. at 190.

supra note 9, at 190-92.
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level of utility, and/or the firm benefits from the gift, then the
contributions are in the firm's self-interest. 3' One possible way for owners
to deal with the agency problem, then, is to structure incentives such that
managers minimize the costs of the donations-or at least maximize their
benefits to the corporation.3 2 We will turn to discussions of the "bottom
line," enlightened self-interest, and agency theory, below.
D. Profit-Maximization
In a 1982 study, Fry, Keim, and Meiners, reported that profit is the
prime impetus for the contributions of most top firms, with charitable
giving serving as a marketing tool in which sales are increased through
enhanced corporate image and visibility.3 3 From a profit-maximizing
standpoint, why would a firm contribute to charity? At first glance,
contributions represent another expense. They are treated for tax purposes
the same as any expense, where the cost of a dollar of giving is still the
complement of the marginal tax rate. If profit-maximizing firms make
contributions, it must be the case that managers and owners believe that
the benefits from contributing outweigh the costs or that gifts are in the
firm's long-run self-interest.
An economist's profit-maximization equation for a firm in any given
time period may be expressed as a function of the firm's costs (expenses),
the price the firm charges for its product (price X quantity sold = sales),
the cost of donations, and potential benefits and costs of the actual
donations (offsets). This type of profit-maximization model may explain
the motivation of corporate executives in allowing various types of
corporate contributions. If contributions affect both the expense and sales
of the firm, then expenditures, which affect either, or both, input or output
sales, may increase firm profits.

31. Managerial utility may affect a firm's decision to have a corporate foundation.
Managers may oppose a foundation if they feel that they will have less power and prestige
when they are no longer in charge of giving decisions. However, many foundation
programs allow managers to be actively involved in corporate giving decisions, and some
direct programs have no manager involvement. The managers whose needs must be met
are usually senior personnel who may become trustees of the foundation or have

significant influence with foundation managers. See id. at 185-87.
32. See id. at 185.
33. See Fry et al., supra note 13, at 105.
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A basic representation of firm profits is:
Profits = Sales - Expenses
The effects of giving on firm profits may be represented:
Profits = Sales - Expenses - Cost of donations + Offsets
The offsets for a company with a direct giving program include:
Offsets = Tax deductions + Sales increases + Returns on
Investments
When a firm uses a corporate foundation to manage some or all of its
charitable donations, other benefits and costs from giving through the
foundation accrue. In 1995, approximately one-fourth of corporate
donations, or about $1.5 billion, came through corporate foundations.34
This paper does not deal with the differences between direct giving
programs and corporate foundations. With regard to economic theory and
profit-maximization, it is adequate to say that policy differences in the
treatment of corporations and nonprofit private corporate foundations, and
analysis of various tax regulations provide some insight into why corporate
executives make specific types of gifts in certain ways.35
From the standpoint of "strict" profit-maximization, corporate
executives choose to make contributions only if they either increase sales
or lower expenses. In the following section, we discuss an updated
version of the profit-maximization model where firm image or reputation
enter into the theoretical model.
E. Profit-Maximization:The Bottom Line and Goodwill
Current views suggest that corporate giving, even if motivated by
managerial utility, altruism, or CSR, must be attuned to the bottom line.36
Gray and Moore noted that "[t]he push in corporate America to justify
every expense has translated into tough questions about how charitable
34. See GIVING 1996, supra note 4, at 89.

35. The major issues are: firms may either make contributions directly, or may make
them through a corporate foundation. Differences exist in deductibility for foundation and
direct corporate gifts. In any year, the tax deduction is the sum of direct gifts to charity
and to the company foundation, but gifts actually received by charities depend on direct
gifts and gifts made by the company foundation. For more on deductibility, and on
advantages and disadvantages of company foundations see Webb, Subsidization, supra

note 9.
36. See Natalie Jeannete Webb, Company Foundations and the Economics of
Corporate Giving (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Duke University) (on file with
author).
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37
donations support companies' drive to become more profitable."
Chrysler, for example, is narrowing its education grants towards those that
improve skills of people preparing to enter the workforce, ideally at
Chrysler.3 8 Rebecca King, manager of corporate giving at Enron, states,
"We're re-evaluating our whole program and deciding if it can fit better
into our strategic plan."" Timothy McClimon, executive director of the
AT&T Foundation, similarly states, "We've had to rethink our
philanthropic strategy to make sure it's in line with our business
strategy." Nancy Dube, manager of corporate community relations for
Digital Equipment Corporation, says the giving program is "a partner with
our marketing department."41
All four of the economic theories explaining corporate giving have at
least one common theme: corporate executives, employees, shareholders,
customers, and the public are influenced by the firm's reputation or image.
No matter what the reason for corporate giving, if one believes that image
translates to sales and costs, firm profits are affected by corporate
contributions. And, as shown by anecdotal evidence, profits may be the
most important factor in explaining levels of funding for corporate giving.
Economists would argue that executives care about the effects of their
donations because they are mindful of benefits on long-term corporate
productivity, costs of giving, and the quality of their charitable
investments. 42 The economic theories of corporate giving may be
expanded by incorporating into the profit-maximizing equation the effects
of reputation or image and the consequences of acting in the firm's
"enlightened self-interest."
How might contributions benefit the firm?
Expanding upon
Burlingame's benefits-public relations, financial performance, and
employee satisfaction-we can link many corporate gifts to efforts to
increase demand or improve the local cultural or business environment in
which the firm operates. It is useful to think about how corporate
contributions enter the profit-maximizing firm's decision. Contributions
may enter the demand and cost functions of the firm, though perhaps only
indirectly. One way to think about how contributions enter these functions
is that they build up firm reputation or a stock of corporate goodwill.

37. Gray & Moore, supra note 7, at 16.

38. See id. at 16, 18.
39. Id. at 18.

40. Id.
41. Id.

42. See, e.g., Richard Steinberg, Should Donors Care About Fundraising?, in THE
EcONOMICS OF NONPROFIT INSTITUTIONS 347 (Susan Rose-Ackerman ed., 1986).
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In cases where contributions are directed at increasing demand, their
effectiveness results in an increase in goodwill in the consumer market
(sales). On the other hand, some contributions benefit employees, their
families, and the quality of life they enjoy, both at work and in the
community. Contributions may also benefit the firm in the eyes of
creditors or regulators that make decisions about the firm. Additionally,
some corporate giving, such as support for youth service or literacy,
improves both the corporate image and the quality of the labor force.
These expenditures may be made to generate or increase a sort of "internal
goodwill." These gifts are also made in order to lower the wages and
benefits required to find, hire, and keep qualified employees, or to lower
some other cost associated with the firm's business operations. By making
these assumptions about how various charitable activities affect firm
goodwill, the analysis takes into account philanthropic, or enlightened
self-interest motives for giving, as well as profit-oriented motives.
The concept of goodwill is extremely important to adequately
explaining the corporate giving function because it captures the intangible
public relations aspect of corporate gifts, and should be included in any
explanation of corporate giving. Perhaps the most useful economic theory
is profit maximization, modified to include gifts that only tangentially, or
over a long period, have positive benefits to the firm.4 3 If corporate
giving is indeed consistent with profit maximization, the question then
becomes, why do some firms choose not to engage in such activities? To
begin to explore this question, we turn to the empirical evidence.
III. THE EMPIRICAL RECORD
Empirical studies of corporate giving concentrate primarily on the
amount and timing of aggregate 'contributions in relation to the price of
giving, corporate income, firm size, industry structure, and advertising.'
Clotfelter provides a summary of the economics studies of aggregate data,
employing both theoretical models and empirical work.4' Maddox and
Siegfried, Navarro, and Stotsky used firm-specific data to address
corporate giving.46
43. See

CLOTFELTER,

supra note 9, at 188-90.

44. See id. at 194-95; see also Peter Navarro, Why Do Corporations Give to
Charity?, 61 J. Bus. 65, 84-86 (1988).
45. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 194-95.
46. See Maddox & Siegfried, supra note 18, at 202-25; Navarro, supranote 44, at
65-67; Janet Stotsky, The Determinants of Giving by Corporate-Sponsored Foundations
(1991) (unpublished manuscript, U.S. Department of the Treasury, Washington, D.C.).
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The existing literature looks at the level of corporate giving, either
total gifts, average gifts, or a ratio of gifts to income. 47 In general, all
models have been designed to study the amount of corporate giving, by
industry or asset size. All four of the previously mentioned motivations
for corporate giving are studied by at least one researcher. Important
empirical studies testing the profit-maximization and altruism motivations
for giving were performed by Navarro, Clotfelter, Maddox and Siegfried,
Bennett and Johnson, Whitehead, Nelson, Schwartz, and Johnson. 8
Oliver Williamson originated the idea that the primary motives of
management have a systematic and significant impact on business
behavior. 49 Navarro, Clotfelter, and Goldberg employ models of
managerial utility in their work. All of these studies, with the exception
of Orace Johnson's, employed econometric analysis to examine the
problem of how much corporations give. Stotsky's study applied the
corporate giving problem to corporate-sponsored foundations.' Some
empirical evidence is found for all the hypotheses. This empirical work
has shown behavior consistent with each of the four motivations. Thus,
it is not exactly clear from the empirical literature what motivates
corporate contributions.
There are many variables used to explain giving. Some of these
include: price, income and scale, industry structure, trend, industry
concentration, market power, rivalry in the market place, advertising,
research and development expenditures, officers' compensation, indexes
of managerial utility, and measures of employment, including the number
of employees and the labor-to-capital ratio.
Price variables measure the responsiveness of corporate giving to the
cost of making contributions. Tax policy affects this cost because the
statutory marginal tax rate sets the price of a dollar of giving at the
complement of the marginal tax rate ("MTR"). 5 z Policy also affects the
after-tax income available to the firm. Empirical studies of price variables
have not shown whether the response to changes in the price of giving is
elastic or inelastic-as measured by changes in the MTR.
47. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 194-95.
48. See id. at 193-221; Navarro, supra note 44, at 77; Maddox & Siegfried, supra
note 18; James T. Bennett & Manuel H. Johnson, Corporate Contributions: Some
Additional Considerations,35 PUB. CHOICE 137 (1980); RALPH L. NELSON, ECONOMIC
FACTORS IN THE GROWTH OF CORPORATION GIVING (1970); R. A. Schwartz, Corporate
PhilanthropicContributions, 23 J. FIN. 479, 479-97 (1968); Orace Johnson, Corporate
Philanthropy: An Analysis of Corporate Contributions, 39 J. Bus. 489 (1966).
49. See WILLIAMSON, supranote 25.
50. See Navarro, supra note 44, at 70-76; CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 193-221.

51. See Stotsky, supra note 46.
52. See CLOTFELTER, supranote 9, at 198-200.
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The MTR is hypothesized to be a good measure of the altruism motive
because it captures the cost to the firm of making donations. Since
donations are fully deductible, a firm effectively pays I-MTR for every
dollar it donates. The government's share is the MTR. When the MTR
rises, it costs less for the firm to donate. If firms maintain relatively
stable giving during periods when marginal tax rates rise or fall (i.e., they
do not respond to changes in the marginal tax rate), then the motivation
for contributions may be altruism.
Net income before taxes is most commonly used to measure income
or scale of a corporation. Net income is readily available from IRS data,
and, as Clotfelter notes, seems to correspond to the economic definition
of profit, at least gross profit. 53 However, Clotfelter also notes that net
income, as defined by the tax law, may not necessarily be the same as
economic profit because depreciation allowances may diverge from true
economic depreciation.54 Another income measure used is cash flow
income, which includes depreciation allowances. Cash flow might better
measure a corporation's ability to contribute since it includes depreciation
allowances, or it might simply be a more accurate representation of
economic profit than net income. Finally, after-tax net income has been
used in some studies.
Industry structure can be measured in different ways, via industry
dummies, looking at giving data by industry, looking at a proxy for the
amount of competition in an industry, or finding variables that are specific
to certain industries such as advertising and concentration ratios. It is well
documented that different industries contribute different percentages of
income. Thus, some measure of industry is nearly always included in
econometric analyses of corporate giving.
Trend variables are always included in time-series analyses in order
to capture the effect of changes in other (excluded) variables over time.
Other variables such as advertising expenditures, firm size, research and
development expenditures, population, and contributions by firms in the
same city or geographical region have been included in past econometric
analyses. Each of these serves a different function. Advertising and
contributions may be similar expenditures. One may substitute or
complement the other. Research and development may be thought of as
an expenditure that signifies a firm in a growth stage. Contributions may
or may not be made by growth firms, depending on the profits the firm
earns, and whether or not all extra earnings are reinvested in research and
53. The price of giving is the complement of the marginal tax rate as long as the
firm has taxable income. The price of $1 of giving for a firm with no taxable income is
$1 unless the deduction for the gift is carried forward (or back) to offset future (or past)
income. See id. at 200.
54. See id. at 199-200.
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development. Firm size is thought to affect contributions, and the smallest
and largest classes of firms donate a higher percentage of their incomes
than do middle-sized firms." Finally, contributions by firms in the same
city or geographical location may be a measure of the pressure firms must
respond to in order to stay in business in a local area.
The
Minneapolis-St. Paul business community, for example, exerts tremendous
56
pressure on firms to contribute up to 5 % of their taxable income.
Empirical research shows that the income elasticity of giving is
positive and ranges between 0.44 and 1.17." Price elasticity is negative
and varies from -0.27 to -2.0, though most studies find values between
-0.27 and -0.4.5 This signifies that contributions fall when the cost of
giving rises. These results are intuitively satisfying, and measurement or
specification errors notwithstanding, provide insight into proposed
legislative changes on corporate charitable giving policies.
Other results that have implications for government or business are
that advertising and research and development are positively related to
giving, which implies that contributions are a complement to these
expenditures, the size of the firm has a "U-shaped" relationship to the
percentage of net income contributed, and certain industries, such as
consumer products and service industries, give generously, while the
utilities and mining industries donate the least. 9
IV. HYPOTHESES DERIVED FROM PROFIT MOTIVATION
What comes out of our review of the economics literature is that there
are good reasons consistent with profit-maximization goals to explain why
firms actually engage in corporate giving. Having established economic
justification for this behavior, the question changes from "why
corporations give?" to "why don't all organizations give to the same
extent?" It is the latter question that motivates the rest of this paper.
Now that we have established a credible economic rationale, we draw upon
the economics literature, and especially the empirical studies, to
hypothesize when firms are more likely to give. Bringing together the
empirical evidence and the theoretical streams that devolve into profit
maximization in the last instance, and assuming that owners, managers,
55. See Maddox & Siegfried, supra note 18, at 202-25.
56. See Joseph Galaskiewicz & Ronald S. Burt, Interorganizational Contagion in
CorporatePhilanthropy, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 88, 88-105 (1991).

57. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 202-05.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 176, 178-79.
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and stakeholders care about profits, we can suggest that firms give more
if:
Hypothesis 1. Corporate income or profits are high (corporate income
may be "relative" income - taxable income normalized by sales).
Hypothesis 2. Taxable income or the expected tax bill is high (the
effective tax rate may be positively related to giving).
Hypothesis 3. They have greater asset bases (scale or size is important),
or because they are larger, they are "expected" to do more (it may be the
case that asset age is as important or more important than asset base).
Hypothesis 4. They require extensive advertising to maintain or gain
market share and sales.
Hypothesis 5. They provide consumer goods or services.
Hypothesis 6. Their owners or managers are leaders in the community
and must be seen as socially responsible, and/or tithing clubs exist in the
geographic area.
Hypothesis 7. They are labor intensive, have a large number of
employees, and training, recruiting, and retention are relatively expensive.
To examine some of these factors, we would look at the relationship
between a firm's giving and its profits, taxes, assets, concentration ratios,
advertising ratios, and other industrial characteristics. In particular, this
might provide insight into giving strategy and the relationship between
industry type (or product type) and giving.
In addition, market
concentration and share, advertising expenditures, importance of brand
name recognition, and substitutability (or other proxies for competition)
might be examined against the amount and types of gifts made by firms in
various industries.
We might expect firms that intend to exist for many years to view
corporate giving as an investment. Firms producing a fad item or those
whose products are becoming outdated may not be interested in corporate
giving. In a related fashion, the views of CEOs or other high-level figures
might depend on their own discount rates and time horizons. Generally,
firms with long product life-cycles, patents, younger management, and
non-rapidly changing technologies might give more, or might participate
in more joint-giving ventures. Finally, firms with very large physical
capital investments, or those constrained geographically (utilities, cable
companies, and those depending on natural resources specific to a certain
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area) might participate to a greater extent in certain types of giving, such
as localized giving or employee-related giving.
Examining the reasons for and extent of corporate participation in
employee-matching grants programs and employee-designated (corporate)
gifts might provide evidence of corporate goodwill, or increasing long-run
profits. The amount and types of gifts made to "public" concerns might
show a relationship to the relative wages paid, recruitment costs, or
retention costs.
In all of the above cases, we can comfortably make the argument that
firms' decisions about corporate giving are consistent with their goals of
profit maximization. The hypotheses are designed to help us understand
when corporate giving is differentially correlated with profit maximization.
We will be interested in elaborating upon this inter-firm differential
through a review of organizational science and sociological theories
addressing these same phenomena.
V. INSIDE THE BLACK Box WITH ORGANIZATION SCIENCE

"Many economists argued that there was no need to look carefully into
the black box called the firm: firms maximized profits (stock market
value); if managers didn't, they would be replaced; and firms that didn't
maximize value wouldn't survive.'
This emphasis on markets "relegated the study of organizations to
business schools, or worse still, to sociologists." 6' It is to business school
and sociological theories that we now turn. Having suggested some
hypotheses that derive from a profit-maximization focus, we complement
these with hypotheses developed from theories that privilege the internal
mechanisms of the firm and begin to dispense with the idea of unitary
interest in profit maximization. We do not dislodge the idea that at least
some actors in a firm are interested in profit maximization, but we will
focus, again, on why some firms give while others do not.
A. OrganizationalTheories
1. Corporate Giving From an Agency Theory Perspective
One of the first steps involved in peering into the black box of the
firm is the realization that the modern joint-stock company is most often
60. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Symposium on Organizationsand Economics, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 15, 15 (1991).
61. id.
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characterized by the separation of ownership from control. 62 In law and
legal tradition, and in modem organization theory, the fact of dispersion
of stock ownership and the concomitant rise of a professional managerial
class has led to the notion of the agency problem as a key to understanding
the actual behavior within the black box. Neoclassical economic theory,
in its promulgating of the profit motive as the sole purpose of the
corporation, tends to discount the agency problem. That problem is
characterized by a class of managers acting in their own self-interest as
variably aligned with the interests of owners.63
The class of agency problems arises in general because management
may pursue a number of goals in the operation of the organization,
including but not limited to: profits, long and short term growth, stability,
security, and innovation. The problem arises when these goals conflict
with the often short-term profit interests of the owners of stock. Yet the
great dispersion of stock ownership since the 1930s has virtually assured
that the owners will remain atomized and unable to exert a collective will
over the manager's control. 64 Even in the face of the rise of institutional
ownership, which has concentrated shares into bigger players' hands, large
and small owners alike are halted in their tracks by the wall of
management protections that legislatures and judiciaries have helped to
construct over the past century. 65 Managers, protected by the law's
Business Judgment Rule, are therefore able to call the organizational shots
with little worry that owners will be able to attain legal remedy for
unpopular decisions. The exceptions are cases of extreme fraud or
negligence.
It has been further theorized that because of the dispersed ownership
of stock in the United States-European and Asian countries often offer a
counterpoising view-control rights, rather than ownership rights, become
most important in for-profit companies.66 This is in direct contrast to a
system, such as feudalism, where benefit, or ownership rights, trumped
the control or usage rights of the peasants. To the extent that we can talk
62. See BERLE & MEANS, supranote 3, at 119-125; see generally Fama & Jensen,

supra note 3; Jensen & Meckling, supra note 3.
63. See Brody, supra note 3, at 471-73.
64. See id. at 473-78.
65. See generally Mark J. Roe, A PoliticalTheory of American CorporateFinance,
91 COLUM. L. REv. 10 (1991); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in
Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 795 (1993); Rikki Abzug and
Daniel Forbes, An Institutional and Agency History of the Contest for Corporate Control:
Bringing the Employees Back In, (Feb. 1996) (on file with New York University Leonard
N. Stem School of Business).
66. See RALF DAHRENDORF, CLASS AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY
41-48 (1959).
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about the modem joint-stock corporation as manager controlled, we may
be able to loosen assumptions about the profit motive directing areas such
as corporate giving. Indeed, with managers in charge, agency problems
around corporate giving shift to economic theories of management altruism
or utility maximization rather than the straight profit maximization of the
firm. Therefore, we might then expect that:
Hypothesis 8. In firms with high degrees of stock dispersion there is
greater managerial discretion in corporate giving.
Of course, this discussion reverts back to the theory of managerial
utility elaborated upon in section II above. While stock diversion may
give managers increased discretion, managers are still making choices
between after-tax profits and corporate contributions, and the latter may
still lead to profit maximization through increased managerial utility as in
the Clotfelter model. 67
2. Corporate Giving From a Stakeholder Perspective
Once we have split managers apart from owners, it is just one more
small theoretical step to tease out other organizational constituencies whose
interests may not be perfectly aligned with the interests of either owners
or managers. In 1984, Richard Freeman introduced the model of
stakeholder management to suggest the idea that, even within the black
box, managers must satisfy many different constituents or organizational
stakeholders. 68 According to Freeman and Reed, the very simple concept
is derived from the notion that corporations are responsible to the groups
upon whose support the organization depends. Stakeholder theory
developed to distinguish primary stakeholders who have formal, official,
or contractual relationships with the focal organizations, from a more
diverse class of secondary stakeholders who are not directly engaged in a
firm's economic activity.
The implications of such modeling (and prescribing) for understanding
corporate giving are varied. From within the organization, constituencies
such as employees as a whole, or divided into professional, occupational,
or other industry groups, can put pressure on organizational managers to
allocate funds outside the organization. Organizational interest groups
upon whom a focal organization is dependent may be seen to be pressuring
67. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 9, at 190-93.
68. See R. EDWARD FREEMAN, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: A STAKEHOLDER
APPROACH (1984); R. Edward Freeman & David L. Reed, Stockholders and

Stakeholders: A New Perspective on CorporateGovernance, 25 CAL. MGMT. REv. 88,
89 (1983) [hereinafter Freeman, Stockholders].

1997]

EXTRA-RATIONAL

MOTIVATIONS FOR CORPORATE GIVING

1053

that focal organization to engage in more giving.
Conceivably,
organizational management can use corporate giving as a way to placate
various internal constituencies to the extent that those constituencies have
outside interests. In general the process would operate as such:
Hypothesis 9. If an organization is dependent on powerful internal
constituencies then its giving practices will reflect the interests of that
constituency.
Perhaps more important for our purposes are not the internal
stakeholders to whom management is beholden, but rather the external
stakeholders who can variably manifest themselves as threats or
opportunities. In this case, two major players in the corporate giving
arena might be local nonprofits and local communities as a whole. While
it may be obvious how a focal organization may perceive a local
community as a threat or an opportunity, it may be less obvious how an
organization may be contractually, or formally related to any particular
nonprofit. Knauer makes the argument that corporate transfers to
nonprofits that help produce a "halo effect" lead to the same organizational
relationships that organizations have with their advertising or marketing
agencies. 69 The focal organization may "contract" with local nonprofits
to obtain the goodwill of the consuming (and supplying) community. This
potential stakeholder relationship explains certain types of targeted
corporate giving and sheds light on cause-related marketing in general. To
the extent that the organization was interested in maintaining a mutually
beneficial relationship with that nonprofit, it might find itself catering to
the organization's needs for funds, promotion, or perhaps talent. The
nonprofit would be able to impose upon the organization for funds and
other resources to the extent that it is seen as a legitimate stakeholder.
Again, the idea of the community as an organization's stakeholder may
be easier to fathom. Indeed the local community working collectively can
put more pressure on organizational actors than most nonprofit
organizations competing for funding. Where local community power is
high, vis a vis a geographically entrenched organization, the community's
will might provide management with rationales for corporate giving. But
just because the community put demands on the organization, there was,
until recently, no reason to expect that organizational management would
comply. With the recent enactments of state constituency laws, the idea
of local communities, and presumably nonprofits, as stakeholders
deserving of organizational attention and resources, has been codified at
69. See Nancy J. Knauer, The Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the
Nature of the Corporation,and the Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REv.
1, 57-64 (1994).
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the level of individual states.7 ° Twenty-nine states allow, and one state
requires, managers to make decisions based on the needs and interests of
these other constituencies. 7' Stakeholder theory suggests that managers
will pay attention to the needs of these constituencies to the extent that
they pose a threat or offer an opportunity. The likelihood that a
constituency will provide a threat or an opportunity is directly related to
the depth of the focal organization's relationship with that constituency.
The preceding discussion leads us to expect:
Hypothesis 10. If an organization is dependent on powerful external
constituencies, such as nonprofits and local communities, then its giving
practices will reflect the interests of those constituencies.
The constituency focus that stakeholder theory allows us may be a
special case of the previously discussed goodwill notion. Organizational
management uses corporate giving to placate internal and external
stakeholders as a way of generating goodwill for the firm. As we have
seen in the previous section, the maximization of goodwill may be
perfectly consistent with goals of profit maximization given the right
environmental conditions.
3. Corporate Giving From a Resource Dependence Perspective
While various stakeholders make demands on organizational
management, it is possible, if not desirable, to push stakeholder theory to
understand the demands that organizational management makes on its
stakeholders.
Indeed, while stakeholders are dependent upon
organizations, organizations may themselves be dependent upon
stakeholders for access to resources. Given this line of thinking, we may
introduce resource dependency theory as the province of the recursive
relationship of organizational management to stakeholders-the other side
of the stakeholder theory coin.7"
Stakeholder theory makes distinctions between stakeholders who are
threats and those who are not.73 Dependency is the key variable.
Resource dependency suggests that focal organizations will engage in
activity not only because stakeholders demand that it be so, but also
70. See Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency
Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 14 (1992).

71. See id. at 27-28, nn.53-58.
72. See generally JEFFREY PFEFFER & GERALD R. SALANCIK, THE EXTERNAL

A RESOURCE DEPENDENCE
73. See Freeman, Stockholders, supra note 68, at 90.
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because the dependency runs in the opposite direction as well.74 If the
focal organization needs the stakeholder for access to resources,
organizational behavior might be more proactive than reactive. Again, the
two external stakeholders we pinpointed above become key players in the
resource dependency scenario.
Organizations may find themselves
dependent upon local communities for employees, services, economic and
social climate, etc., and they may find themselves dependent upon
particular nonprofit organizations for their halos. This leads us to suggest,
according to resource dependence theory, that:
Hypothesis 11. If an organization is particularly tied to a geographic
position, it will be more active in corporate giving, particularly in that
geographic region.
Hypothesis 12. If an organization is in need of image improvement or
refinement, it will be more active in corporate giving.
Resource dependency theory gives us an organizational rationale to
understand some of the differences we observe in the levels of giving
between firms. Again, it is consistent with the hypotheses that we
suggested arise from the goodwill and profit maximization theories of
economists.
Resource dependence helps us to understand the
environmental context for firms' decisions not to give in light of the profit
maximizing benefits of increases in goodwill.
4. Corporate Giving From an Institutional Theory Perspective
Once agency and stakeholder theory have effectively split managers
and their goals apart from the profit goals of owners, we can use other
organizational theories to explore further alternative motivations of
managers. Over the past twenty years, an impressive neo-institutional
literature has been built based on the idea that organization decisions often
defy economic (profit-seeking) rationales.75 Seeking to answer the
question of what makes managers veer from the straight and narrow of
profit seeking, the neo-institutionalists have looked for other engines of
rationalization which they find in the form of actions of government, other
74. See id. at 91-92.
75. See, e.g., JOHN W. MEYER AND RICHARD W. SCOTT, ORGANIZATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTS: RITUAL AND RATIONALITY (1983); THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM IN
ORGANIZATIONAL ANALYSIS (Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio, eds. 1991); John

W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, InstitutionalizedOrganizations:Formal Structure as Myth
and Ceremony, 83 AM. J. Soc. 340 (1977).
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organizations, and norms and rituals.76 Neo-institutionalists argue that,
especially in environments characterized by high uncertainty where the
profit-seeking path is not always clear, managers will seek legitimacy."
To ensure company survival and access to resources, if not necessarily
market leadership or above-normal rents, managers will play to various
audiences, making decisions that signal their worthiness to these alternative
arenas of attention. This may be akin to goodwill.
Institutionalists focus, then, on the environments surrounding
managers as the source of alternative rationalizations. Specifically,
institutionalists focus on the nation-state and its laws and legal
environment, organized actors such as unions, and the ritualized norms
and symbols characteristic of professional actors, as the important engines
driving managerial allocation decisions. DiMaggio and Powell have
suggested that these three sources give rise to three mechanisms for
achieving organizational isomorphism in the face of competitive
differentiating pressures: coercive, mimetic, and normative.
On the question of coercive isomorphism as a driving force for
corporate giving we would have to look at government mandates and the
legal environment encouraging or constraining such actions. Robert Clark
has argued that the "high idealism" we might expect to guide the giving
manager is not embodied in current statutes and case law, 79 however,
"modest idealism" would be acceptable to the courts. 80 Clark notes that
despite a few exceptions, courts remain committed to the assumption that
the primary purpose of the organization is to make profits for its
shareholders, and managers' actions must be rationalized in that context. 8'
Indeed, historically, corporate giving had been antithetical to corporate law
in many states.82 It took Congress' enactment of the corporate charitable
contribution deduction provisions in 1935 to change local jurisdictions'
prohibitions of corporate contributions. 83 Kahn also notes the reversal of
76. See Frank R. Dobbin et al., The Expansion of Due Process in Organizations,
in INSTITUTIONAL PATTERNS AND ORGANIZATIONS (Lynne

G. Zucker ed., 1988); James

N. Baron et al., War and Peace: The Evolution of Modern PersonnelAdministration in
U.S. Industry, 92 AM. J. Soc. 350 (1986); Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell,
The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in
OrganizationalFields, 48 AM. Soc. REv. 147 (1983).
77. See DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 76.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at 150-54.
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 690 (1986).

id. at 686.
id. at 682.
generally Knauer, supra note 69.

83. See id.
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current state law on the issue of corporate charitable giving. 8 She
suggests that modem philanthropy laws contrast with the traditional wealth
maximization spirit of state corporation law.Y It is exactly the point at
which the legal environment gives ambiguous signals, when managers have
the room to mediate their compliance. 6 While state corporate law may not
specifically encourage corporate giving, at the national level, the IRS's
deduction provisions provide legitimacy to this kind of organizational
behavior. Institutionalists might then predict that:
Hypothesis 13. Where national tax policy is bolstered by state and local
laws in support of corporate giving, we can expect to find higher levels of
corporate giving.
Just because the law permits, does not suggest that managers will
submit. Other institutional forces might drive managers from the
hypothetical to the actual. DiMaggio and Powell suggested that within
organizational sets, organizations look to market leaders or otherwise
successful companies as models to follow. 87 Presumably, if such
companies engaged in corporate giving activities, other organizations
facing uncertain environments would attempt to legitimate themselves
through the mimetic process of imitating the successful company. In this
way, one organizational prospector could set the corporate giving trend for
a host of industry followers s8 Institutionalists would then expect that:
Hypothesis 14. In industries with corporate giving market leaders,
periphery firms will soon adopt corporate giving practices.
As previously mentioned, economists in this field have been
particularly sensitive to inter-industry differences in giving trends. The
institutionalists help explain why we might find such differentials.
Institutionalists might further suggest that to the extent that corporate
giving ideologies are embodied in individuals or even whole professions,
these ideologies may be transferred through normative processes. When
84. See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora'sBox: Managerial Discretion and the
Problem of CorporatePhilanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997).

85. See id. at 584.
86. See Lauren B. Edelman, Legal Environments and OrganizationalGovernance:
The Expansion of Due Process in the American Workplace, 95 AM. J. Soc. 1401 (1990);
Lauren B. Edelman, LegalAmbiguity and Symbolic Structures:OrganizationalMediation
of Civil Rights Law, 97 AM. J. Soc. 1531, 1538-41 (1992).

87. See generally DiMaggio & Powell, supra note 76.
88. See RAYMOND E. MILES & CHARLES C. SNOW, ORGANIZATIONAL
STRUCTURE, AND PRocEss 49-67 (1978).
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managers who engage in corporate giving move from one company to
another, they may take with them corporate giving precedents. Likewise,
some professionals may be imbued with altruistic motivations that may be
realized at the level of corporate practice. Thus, institutionalists might
predict that:
Hypothesis 15. Where altruistic professionals dominate an industry,
organizations in that industry may be expected to have higher levels of
corporate giving than comparable organizations in other industries.
In sum, the institutionalists have given teeth to many of the corporate
giving predictions that arise from the economists' interest in profit
maximization through whatever means available. While none of the
organizational theories embraces the overarching goals of profit
maximization as a management incentive in corporate giving, all of the
theories can be thought to be amenable to such a reading. The main
contribution of the hypotheses we developed through both economic theory
and organization science, is how to predict existence and levels of
corporate giving while keeping profit-maximization goals constant.
VI. RAPPROCHEMENT
The preceding hypotheses, derived from organizational sociology and
management science, provide the conditions under which some firms will
choose to engage (or not) in corporate giving behaviors. These hypotheses
might obtain whether profit maximization is an actual or idealized goal.
In this way, the hypotheses can be joined with the hypotheses from the
previous section delineating the economic perspective as a way to
introduce organizational contingencies into the study of determinants of
corporate giving as an (extra)rational approach to profit maximization.
All of these hypotheses may be used to motivate additional empirical
research on the topic of corporate giving. While corporate giving may
indeed be consistent with profit maximization, it would be quite helpful to
tease out those instances when such a relationship does not exist.
Similarly, it would advance knowledge in the field to understand the
environmental conditions under which corporate giving does, indeed, lead
to profit maximization in both the short term and the long term.
We hope that we have demonstrated that organization science theories
can be used in conjunction with economic theories to shed light on internal
and external contexts of the pursuit of long and short term profits. In so
doing, we hope that we have opened up a pathway for economists to talk
to organizational theorists about motivations for firm behaviors. More
work is needed, but we are glad to be able to shed light on the motivations
of corporate giving in such a way that economists and organization
theorists can begin the critique together.

